Don't let this...
Creditcane™: REPETERE AD INFINITUM: CAVEAT EMPTOR.
Bullish long day. Midpoint above EMA(10). Tested and held SMA(21). Still failing the 0.0% retrace (1463.76). No daily 3LB changes (reversal is 1465.77). QE2infinity. Still below the trend line and back above the other trend line.
Bearish long day. Midpoint below EMA(10). Still failing the 38.2% retrace (79.97). Tested and failed SMA(21). Dally 3LB reversal down (reversal is 80.10).
Bullish short day. Midpoint below EMA(10). Tested and held SMA(21). Holding above its 0.0% retrace (14.27). No daily 3LB changes (reversal is 13.88).
Bullish short day. Midpoint below EMA(10). Holding above its 38.2% retrace (1730.90). Still failing SMA(21). No daily 3LB changes (reversal is 1775.70). Must have the precious.
Bullish long day. Midpoint above EMA(10). Tested and held SMA(21). Still failing its 38.2% retrace (1.3127). No daily 3LB changes (reversal is 1.3128).
Bullish short day. Midpoint above EMA(10). Holding above SMA(21). Holding above its 61.8% minor retrace (40.10). No daily 3LB changes (reversal is 40.73).
Bullish short day. Tested and held SMA(21). Midpoint above EMA(10). Still failing its 38.2% minor retrace (17.47). No daily 3LB changes (reversal is 18.70).
Bullish short day. Tested and held SMA(21). Midpoint above EMA(10). Holding above its 61.8% minor retrace (90.85). No dally 3LB changes (reversal is 92.48).
Bullish short day. Still failing SMA(21). Midpoint below EMA(10). Holding above its 38.2% minor retrace (32.24). No daily 3LB changes (reversal is 35.10).
Spinning top day. Midpoint below EMA(10). Tested and failed SMA(21). Tested and held its 50.0% minor retrace (50.01). No daily 3LB changes (reversal is 51.64).
Bullish short day. Still failing all SMA's. Midpoint below EMA(10). Holding above its 0.0% retrace (0.7536). No daily 3LB changes (reversal is 0.7800).
Bullish short day. Midpoint below EMA(10). Still failing SMA(21). Holding above its 38.2% retrace (3.673). No daily 3LB changes (reversal is 3.688).
Bullish long day. Tested and held SMA(89). Midpoint below EMA(10). Tested and held its 38.2% minor retrace (647.26). No daily 3LB changes (reversal is 652.59).
Bullish harami day. Midpoint below EMA(10). Tested and held SMA(55). Tested and held its 50.0% minor retrace (574.84). No daily 3LB changes (reversal is 569.70).
IT HAS BEGUN. YOU HAVE BEEN WARNED.
...lead to this.
5 comments:
OMG why do I torture myself? Turned from NFL Network to CNBS. My ears begin bleeding and I have uncontrollable vomiting. Just sayin'
http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/alasdair-macleod/money-printing-only-thing-keeping-system-afloat
Commercial Banks
The banks are cautious about lending to indebted borrowers, and they have failed to adequately devalue collateral against existing loans. The result is that with no bank credit being made available to support renewed buying of assets, asset valuations are constantly on the verge of collapse. Put another way, banks have backed off from creating ever-increasing levels of debt to perpetuate the pre-crisis asset bubble.
One should not take comfort in attempts to improve asset ratios. According to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the ratio of total assets to risk-adjusted Tier 1 level capital is currently 11.25; but this does not adequately reflect off-balance sheet activities and non-banking business such as derivatives. The inclusion of derivatives on US bank balance sheets as a net as opposed to gross exposure, seriously misstates actual risk.
Banks therefore face two different problems. An on-paper write-down of collateral assets of less than 9% wipes out the entire banking system, with a far lower threshold for many banks. Changes in GAAP accounting rules over asset valuations in the wake of the Lehman crisis have allowed them to hide losses, a situation that is still unresolved and suggests the banking system is already close to the edge. Furthermore, any failure in the derivative counterparty-chain threatens to trigger a collapse of the larger banks where derivative exposure is concentrated.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-15/sorry-u-s-recoveries-really-aren-t-different.html
Sorry, U.S. Recoveries Really Aren’t Different
Five years after the onset of the 2007 subprime financial crisis, U.S. gross domestic product per capita remains below its initial level. Unemployment, though down from its peak, is still about 8 percent. Rather than the V- shaped recovery that is typical of most postwar recessions, this one has exhibited slow and halting growth.
This disappointing performance shouldn’t be surprising. We have presented evidence that recessions associated with systemic banking crises tend to be deep and protracted and that this pattern is evident across both history and countries. Subsequent academic research using different approaches and samples has found similar results.
Recently, however, a few op-ed writers have argued that, in fact, the U.S. is “different” and that international comparisons aren’t relevant because of profound institutional differences from one country to another. Some of these authors, including Kevin Hassett, Glenn Hubbard and John Taylor -- who are advisers to the Republican presidential nominee, Mitt Romney -- as well as Michael Bordo, who supports the candidate, have stressed that the U.S. is also “different” in that its recoveries from recessions associated with financial crises have been rapid and strong. Their interpretation is at least partly based on a 2012 study by Bordo and Joseph Haubrich, which examines the issue for the U.S. since 1880.
Gross Misinterpretations
We have not publicly supported or privately advised either campaign. We well appreciate that during elections, academic economists sometimes become advocates. It is entirely reasonable for a scholar, in that role, to try to argue that a candidate has a better economic program that will benefit the country in the future. But when it comes to assessing U.S. financial history, the license for advocacy becomes more limited, and we have to take issue with gross misinterpretations of the facts.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/110252325/Crisis-Timeline
The Financial Crisis: A Timeline of Events and Policy Actions
Nuevo.
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